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        <title>Agent Assembly Blog</title>
        <link>https://agent-assembly.com/blog</link>
        <description>Agent Assembly Blog</description>
        <lastBuildDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</lastBuildDate>
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        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[SDKs Are Not Security Boundaries]]></title>
            <link>https://agent-assembly.com/blog/sdks-are-not-security-boundaries</link>
            <guid>https://agent-assembly.com/blog/sdks-are-not-security-boundaries</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[An in-process SDK is the fastest way to govern an agent — but it is not, by itself, a]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>An in-process SDK is the fastest way to govern an agent — but it is not, by itself, a
security boundary. Anything running in the same process can bypass it.</p>
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<p>That's why Agent Assembly is built as three independently-deployable layers:</p>
<ul>
<li class=""><strong>SDK (in-process)</strong> — fastest path; applies pre-execution allow/deny and emits events.</li>
<li class=""><strong>Sidecar proxy</strong> — enforces network egress with no code changes; catches what the SDK misses.</li>
<li class=""><strong>eBPF (kernel)</strong> — uprobes on SSL libraries plus exec/file syscall hooks catch everything,
including deliberate bypass attempts.</li>
</ul>
<p>Each layer raises the cost of evasion. The SDK is for adoption and speed; the proxy and eBPF
layers are where the boundary becomes hard to cross. Treating the SDK as the whole story is the
mistake — defense in depth is the point.</p>]]></content:encoded>
            <category>Engineering</category>
            <category>Security</category>
        </item>
        <item>
            <title><![CDATA[Why Agent Assembly Exists]]></title>
            <link>https://agent-assembly.com/blog/why-agent-assembly-exists</link>
            <guid>https://agent-assembly.com/blog/why-agent-assembly-exists</guid>
            <pubDate>Thu, 25 Jun 2026 00:00:00 GMT</pubDate>
            <description><![CDATA[Autonomous agents are shipping into production faster than the controls around them.]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Autonomous agents are shipping into production faster than the controls around them.
An agent that can call tools can move money, touch customer data, and reach the open
internet — usually with the same credentials as the human who deployed it, and with
secrets sitting inside the model's context window.</p>
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<p>Agent frameworks make agents <em>capable</em>. They don't give an agent an identity, constrain
its authority, or keep secrets out of the model's reach. That gap is what Agent Assembly
closes: a runtime boundary that gives every agent an identity, limits what it can do, and
injects secrets at execution time so they never enter the context the model can see.</p>
<p>This blog is where we'll share the build — engineering notes, security decisions, and the
story of making a governance layer for autonomous agents.</p>]]></content:encoded>
            <category>Founder's Notes</category>
            <category>Security</category>
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